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GERALD W. SCULLY (1992) Constitutional Environments and Economic 
Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gerald W. Scully's book addresses how government affects economic growth 
and income distribution and, within ten chapters, provides a detailed, scholarly 
and original treatment of this most important issue. Rather than taking the 
traditional focus of examining the relationship between public spending and 
economic performance, Scully extends the analysis of the role of the public 
sector by examining how the legal, political and economic framework of society 
influences economic growth and income distribution. The central theme is that 
the constitutional setting of an economy is an extremely important determinant 
of the ability of individuals to transform economic resources into output. The 
research question that Scully examines i whether or not there is a link between 
individual iberty and national economic pzogress. 
Chapter i concludes with the hypothesis that economic growth is as affected 
by choice of the economic, legal, and political institutions as it is by resource 
endowment and technological progress. Economic, legal and political systems 
embody visions of human progress and, from alternative visions, come argu- 
ments in support or against such issues as collective ownership of resources 
and public sector allocation of resources. In other words, alternative visions 
lead to alternative "rules of the games" for the rights and responsibilities of
the individual versus government and the rules and order of a society. In 
Chapter 2, Scuily suggests that the traditional focus of economists considers 
growth to be a mechanical process, a sort of alchemy, which is wholly deter- 
mined by growth of inputs and the laws of production. Neoclassical growth 
models imply hypothesize a relationship between ational income and capital- 
labor ratios, with technology fixed and the resulting "black box" theory is 
argued to contribute nothing to the debate of individual versus government 
control of resources. 
Building on the research program initiated by Buchanan and Tullock, Chapter 
3 derives a theory of how the range of the constitutional setting determines 
the possible gains from exchange. Topics include how the scope and inclusive- 
ness of individual rights affect efficiency and income distribution, the impor- 
tance of policies regarding dispute resolution and enforcement ofagreements, 
how rational individuals contract for income re-distribution policies during 
the pre-constitutional stage, whether ules of order emerge spontaneously or
through fiat and the role played by legal systems. The theory of the evolution 
of the constitutional setting is developed in Chapter 4. Through amendments 
to constitutions and by laws passed by legislatures, changes may be made in 
the constitutional setting. By expanding the role of the monopoly agents of 
government to include the brokering of changes in the structure of rights, a 
pattern of the evolution of the constitution is shown to lead to a steady-state 
constitutional setting. Rent-seeking and constitutional revolution are shown to 
be substitutes for growth-enhancing activities. 
Measures of economic liberty for a wide range of countries are constructed 
in Chapter 5. Fifteen attributes of economic liberty are argued to meet the 
criteria of being credible and include: freedom of property, movement, informa- 
tion, civil rights, type of economic system and freedom of print and broadcast 
media. In order to weigh the attributes of liberty in constructing an overall 
index of liberty, ScuUy uses an instrumental variable or hedonic approach and 
weights by regression coefficients. In Chapter 6, various hypotheses regarding 
effects of legal systems on freedom are developed and tested on a sample of 
167 countries. Fifty-four countries have common (or judge-made) law where 
legal rules emerge from the judicial resolution of disputes between parties of 
equal standing. Ninety-four of the countries operate under civil law which 
basically means that law is what those who govern say it is. Also discussed 
are Muslim law (41 countries in the sample) and Marxist-Leninist law 
(19 countries). The general hypothesis that liberty is greatest under common 
law and empirical evidence confirms that freedom has prospered under common 
law and liberty suffers under other traditions. In Chapter 7, economic growth 
and efficiency measures for 115 economies over the period 1960-1980 are 
compared to measures of freedom. Regression analysis hows that the rights 
structure has significant and large effects on efficiency and the growth rate of 
economies. Relatively free countries are found to grow at three times the rate 
and are two and one-half times as efficient economically in transforming inputs 
into national output as countries in which freedom is relatively absent. 
Empirical evidence in Chapter 8 demonstrates that a large fraction of the 
observed inequality of income across countries is due to inequality in individual 
rights. Societies are shown to have much larger shares of income going to the 
middle 60 percent of the distribution when they are politically open, have 
private property and market allocation of resources. Conventional wisdom of 
a negative trade-off between efficiency and equity is not observed and therefore 
suggests that an increase in freedom yields an improvement both in efficiency 
and in equity. Changes which raise freedom are therefore argued to be Pareto- 
efficient. 
In Chapter 9, the effects of government expenditures on economic growth and 
efficiency are measured. Consistent with previous tudies, empirical evidence 
shows that nations with large public sectors grow more slowly than those with 
small public sectors. The evidence on economic efficiency, however, has not 
been previously examined and shows that smaller public sectors tend to have 
more efficient economies. The final chapter sums up the evidence in the follow- 
ing way: "Private property, freedom of contract, and free market exchange 
free the Scotsman i  everyone. Collective ownership and the political allocation 
of resources waste a nation's natural endowment" (213). 
I will only focus on two of Scully's contributions here. One contribution is 
his logical integration of the theory of constitutional political economy into the 
theory of economic growth. One need only browse through recent articles and 
books on economic development to witness first hand the extent to which 
academicians have ignored the role of the constitutional setting in influencing 
economic performance. With the seminal work of Buchanan and TuUock as 
the cornerstone ofhis theory, Scully logically eads the reader into understand- 
ing the role of the constitutional framework in determining the possibilities of 
gains from exchange which ultimately play a crucial role in determining how 
economic resources are transferred into national income. While the tradition 
of public finance has examined the costs and benefits of having the public sector 
direct resource allocations, constitutional political economy demonstrates that 
the design of institutions is also an important choice that economists may 
examine. Scully's book provides evidence on the influence of institutions, 
or rules, upon economic performance. Another contribution is the wealth of 
empirical evidence provided on a large variety of hypotheses. This is clearly 
a case where theory and empirical work blend together to produce aconvincing 
argument. By going beyond the traditional focus on public spending, examina- 
tion of liberty and legal variables i  clearly in the best tradition of what constitu- 
tional political economy adds to the study of the public sector. 
One indication of the usefulness of a book is whether or not it leaves the 
reader with applications in other areas. Two applications come easily to my 
mind. One area is how the issue of federalism affects the constitutional environ- 
ment. While Scuily briefly argues that countries in which central governments 
are awarded relatively large roles are also countries with relatively large public 
sectors, I am left wondering how, within the constitutional political economy 
framework, federalism affects economic growth and income distribution. 
Another application is in the area of restrictions on the influence of the public 
sector in our lives. Scully briefly discusses three methods of constraining the 
public sector: (1) constitutional restrictions on taxes and expenditures; (2) a 
Wicksellian voting rule of unanimity; and (3) a principle of taxation equal to 
benefits as in user fees. I believe that it would also be useful to consider the 
implications of his work regarding the importance of legal, political and eco- 
nomic institutions for the growing literature which studies how to design con- 
straints on the role of the public sector in our lives. For example, how would 
a constitutional political economist re-design international political agencies, 
such as the World Bank, so that they take advantage of the advice offered in 
this book? Is it possible for these agencies to re-direct heir policies in such a 
way that they promote fficient re-design of the constitutional environments 
of less-developed countries? 
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